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Help Save 1.800.SUICIDE


Shooting Blanks in the Next World Order

by rcs1

You're a superpower that's already beaten up the rest of the world.  What do you do, go to Disney Land or continue to beat up on the rest of the world?

Rome and Napoleonic France are but two historic examples of empires that failed to realize the military power that created them was insufficient, in itself, to sustain them.

If there's something good to come from the Iraq war, it's that perhaps the United States will have learned a lesson about wielding great power in time to avoid becoming a footnote in some other culture's history book.  

Under the fold: carrying the biggest stick can wear you out...


commentary :: :: :: buzz-it!
With an arms budget equal to the military expenditures of the rest of the world combined, the United States represents the most lopsided balance of military might seen in the industrial age.  The problem with that kind of dominance is that there are very few instances where armed conflict is altogether necessary, and even fewer where an armed conflict will turn out well.

The Clausewitzean theory of absolute war became all but obsolete with the advent of a bipolar world in which the two superpowers possessed arsenals that could have ended human life on the planet.  The Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) theory rested on another of Clausewitz's dictums, that war is political in nature, and that no desired political aim of either side could be achieved through global thermo-nuclear war.  

With the fall of the Soviet Union, absolute war became even more moot.  The United States could, if it wished, quite literally blow every other nation off the map.  But what would be the political purpose in that?  (And as songwriter Randy Newman might ask, where would we go on vacation?)

Barring truly extraordinary provocation, America is limited to use of its conventional forces in armed conflict, but even in conventional wars, the power ratio between the U.S. and any opponent is ridiculous.  There is no conventional military force in existence that we can't make fairly quick work of (which is one reason no one is seriously trying to build a conventional force that could take ours on).  Hence the kind of asymmetric, insurgent style conflict we currently witness in Iraq.  

Let's set one thing straight about counterinsurgency operations.  There are better and worse ways to conduct them, but there is no good way to conduct them.  And you can't design a military that specializes in counterinsurgency because then it wouldn't be good at doing what it's supposed to do, which is fight and defeat other military forces.  

Counterinsurgencies get out of hand when the occupying force, frustrated at being unable quell the revolt, starts lining large sections of the population up in front of firing squads.  Once you start doing that kind of thing, you wind up killing a whole lot of people--enough that it might have been better to just drop a bunch of nukes on them.  

And what's that going to get you politically if you're a sole superpower that insists other nations respect human rights?

(Sidebar: an AP report from late Tuesday says:

Iraq's new prime minister promised "no mercy" for terrorists Tuesday as President Bush paid a surprise visit to Baghdad on the eve of a security crackdown involving 75,000 troops, road closures and a curfew.

Stand by for this to turn uglier than Frankenstein's baby.)  

Being Careful How You Use It

One of the dangers of a sole super power maintaining a standing, all-volunteer military of overwhelming combat force is that it's tempting to overuse, especially when you have an administration in power--like the one we have now--that's predisposed to overuse it.

Back in my active duty days, I wrote to a friend, "Every time our political leaders commit us to major armed conflict, they expose our failure to achieve our main purpose in the post-modern, post-Soviet world, which is to deter armed conflicts."  

Under the neoconservative regime, we not only gave up on the idea of deterring armed conflicts, we purposely set out to create them.  And, lamentably, we shined our heinies in Iraq by showing the entire world that we're very good at starting "preemptive" wars that by their very natures are not "winnable."

In the Next World Order, America needs to come up with a new calculus of power.  The old equations simply don't work any more.

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Commander Jeff Huber, U.S. Navy (Retired) writes from Virginia Beach, Virginia.  Read his weekday commentaries at ePluribus Media and Pen and Sword.

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Jeff's Next World Order Series

Display:
This might be one of history's most complex counter-whatever asymmetric wars.  Civil war, sectarian violence, al  Qaeda global terrorism influence (however little there may be), general civil unrest and crime...

I'm not one to make excuses for Abizaid, but Franks left him a mess.  

by Jeff Huber on Wed Jun 14, 2006 at 11:56:26 AM EST

I agree with you (as usual) on the nature of the warfare, but believe as lunacy works down the Chain, it has to stop at the General Staff.  Too many good people dying because of their failure to act, or prevent actions taken.

by rba on Wed Jun 14, 2006 at 12:45:20 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I agree entirely with your view of the difficulties of conventional armies, even of vastly superior strength in fighting against insurgencies.

Vietnam showed that and I am at a loss to understand why these lessons are so difficult for the military to learn.

America should know this fact better than anyone. They fought and beat the British with insurgents who appeared one day and fought and then disappeared the next to tend to their harvests and then appeared again. A British commander in the field wrote back home in sheer frustration: "these Americans will not stand and fight". These difficulties prompted William Pitt to say in Parliament: "You cannot conquer a map".

The French found the same in Algeria, brutal though the paratroopers were in their ruthless hunting down of those seeking independence.

So Iraq is not "winnable"? No, I disagree with this conclusion. The ugly and unacceptable truth is that it has been shown that it is possible to subdue and govern that country. The example, of course, is Saddam Hussein and his lengthy reign.

I fully accept that you anticipated this answer in your commentary when you write of the unacceptable cost of treading in the footsteps of such a ruthless dictator.

How this can be achieved politically and the implications it has for the Democratic Party and the progressive community warrants a separate commentary of its own. These implications are enormous in relation to the exercise of United States international power and the type of society that it creates back home. It is particularly difficult for members of ePluribus Media to mentally encompass because first you have to put aside all questions of international legality and basic humanity. The scenario now being created by the White House in Iraq, however, is making the Kerry-type motions to "bring the troops back home" seem increasingly anachronistic, as your sidebar AP report at the end demonstrates.

by Welshman on Wed Jun 14, 2006 at 12:42:25 PM EST

I don't call starting to behave like Hussein in order to subdue an insurgency "winning."  Not in the post-modern world.  

by Jeff Huber on Wed Jun 14, 2006 at 12:59:52 PM EST
[ Parent ]
In agreeing, however, you must assure me, if you dismiss it as impossible to conceive in Iraq, that the West has not maintained its interests in any part of the world over the last fifty years by not supporting and working through a dictatorship or even a ruthless democratically elected government. You need also to assure me that this has not had the apathetic and disinterested acceptance of our people, who have valued the economic benefits.

by Welshman on Wed Jun 14, 2006 at 01:34:39 PM EST
[ Parent ]
..but I think you will understand my meaning.

by Welshman on Wed Jun 14, 2006 at 01:37:30 PM EST
[ Parent ]
...Well, I think I do.  

And, if I do, I agree that we have let brutal dictators--including and especially Hussein--do our dirty work for us.  A lot of that we excused away as the fight against monolithic global communism, and there was for a time, perhaps, genuine concern about the Soviets gaining major access and influence in South America.  

Part of the point I'm trying to make is that as a sole superpower, those excuses start wearing mighty thin.  

I'll cover this ground more extensively later in the NWO series.  It's quite complex stuff.

by Jeff Huber on Wed Jun 14, 2006 at 03:04:10 PM EST

When Franks finally retired, I read Abizaid's bio and thought CENTCOM finally had a commander who understood asymetric warfare.  That's what I get for thinking.

We have a fairly substantial list of General Staff who have either resigned or been forced out - and subsequently spoken out - when they felt that the political was directly interferring with sound military practice.  Unfortunately there are always those who will replace them and simply genuflect towards D.C.

I think history will show we made a big mistake consolidating power in the office of the SecDef.  And a worse mistake turning over operational military duties to the private sector.  Beyond broken, and in desperate need of a fix.

by rba on Wed Jun 14, 2006 at 11:47:29 AM EST

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